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Abstract—Recently, deep neural networks have significant 
progress and successful application in various fields, but they are 
found vulnerable to attack instances, e.g., adversarial examples. 
State-of-art attack methods can generate attack images by adding 
small perturbation to the source image. These attack images can 
fool the classifier but have little impact to human. Therefore, 
such attack instances are difficult to generate by searching the 
feature space. How to design an effective and robust generating 
method has become a spotlight. Inspired by adversarial examples, 
we propose two novel generative models to produce adaptive 
attack instances directly, in which conditional generative 
adversarial network is adopted and distinctive strategy is 
designed for training. Compared with the common method, such 
as Fast Gradient Sign Method, our models can reduce the 
generating cost and improve robustness and has about one fifth 
running time for producing attack instance. 
Keywords—DNN attack; adversarial examples; generative 
adversarial network 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Past several years have observed significant progress of 
machine learning in many artificial intelligence tasks, 
including computer vision [1, 2], natural language processing 
[3]. However, recently researches [4] have made a discovery 
that most of machine learning models, especially deep 
learning, are highly vulnerable to some well-designed attack 
methods. Such attack may cause serious problem, because 
machine learning has been used for safety-related application, 
e.g., self-driving, user verification and energy management. 
With universal approximation theorem [5], researchers 
achieved great success when they used deep neural network to 
approximate the ideal function that maps input images to their 
labels. However, there still exist some differences between the 
network and the ideal function. More formally, we can define 
the input as x, the classifier as f, the label as y, and the 
subspace {x| f(x)≠y} as R. For most of cases, the subspace R 
definitely exists, which guarantees the possibility of network 
attack. 
 The methods to generate adversarial examples are the 
state-of-art attack methods. Adversarial examples refer to 
those generated instances with small perturbation on source 
ones. Szegedy et al. [6] discovered that adversarial examples 
can fool some of start-of-the-art DNN-based models with high 
probability, such as ResNet [7] and DenseNet [8]. This 
phenomenon suggests that it is necessary to analyze the cause 
of adversarial examples and prevent our model from the attack 
of these examples. 
Researchers have proposed various methods to generate 
adversarial example, such as gradient based methods, Fast 
Gradient Sign Method(FGSM) [6], search samples based on 
the gradient of the target model. Optimization-based methods, 
e.g. Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack [9], introduce 
metrics to measure the effect of perturbation and the 
perturbation are optimized based on this metric.  
However, it is expensive for current methods to generate 
adversarial examples since it costs large computation to search 
for adversarial example in high-dimension subspace. Besides, 
we not only should fool the model to produce misclassified 
outputs, but also should make the difference between 
adversarial sample and original data as small as possible. 
Some other methods find their ways to fool the target with 
well-designed noise [10]. Vaidya et al. [11] proposed to 
generate an obfuscated command that is accepted by the 
victim’s speech recognition system but is indecipherable by a 
human listener. These methods make it possible to access 
devices like cell phones without authorization. 
Most of the previous work either need much computation 
based on the input, or can be detected by people easily as the 
instances are obvious artificial noise. In this work, we propose 
two methods to use the conditional generative adversarial net 
framework to train a generative model, which can output 
images able to fool the classifier while remaining correctly 
classified by a human observer. The first method named 
conditional generative adversarial network for fake examples 
(CGAN-F) tries to generate images from Gaussian noise and 
proves the possibility to generate attack instances directly 
without source images. We expect that more people can pay 
attention to the safety of the DNN by the first method. 
Inspired by the adversarial examples, we propose another 
method, which is named as conditional generative network for 
adversarial example (CGAN-Adv). In this method, we 
separate the generating process into two steps, the generation 
of raw image and the generation of corresponding perturbation. 
Then we apply element-wise sum and normalization with the 
two parts to get the attack image. The CGAN-Adv is efficient 
in generating images, and it can be observed that the output of 
CGAN-Adv is better than that of CGAN-F. 
The main contributions of our work are summarized as 
follow: 
 Distinguished from the previous work, our methods 
generate the attack images from noise. In this way, the 
large storage cost can be saved in DNN attack. 
 Most of existing methods require large number of 
computations to produce an attack example, but our 
methods only need one round of forward propagation, 
which are quite efficient. 
 We apply normalization after the element-wise sum to 
address the problem of pixel value overflow. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will 
review some related work about adversarial examples and 
generative adversarial networks. In section 3, we give the 
details of the proposed method. Section 4 gives the 
experimental result of our methods. Finally, we conclude our 
work in Section 5. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Adversarial examples 
The traditional adversarial examples generating methods 
are widely used in the current state-of-art network attack 
works. We define f as the classifier, x as raw input and dx as 
the desired perturbation. So, we can use a approximate 
function to model the task of generating adversarial examples 
as follows 
    
x
x x
d
arg min d subject to f x d f x ，   (1) 
Mainly, the methods of generating adversarial examples 
can be categorized into two types, gradient-based ones and 
optimization-based ones. The gradient-based methods employ 
the gradient policy to seek for attacking examples, e.g., Seyed-
Mohsen [12] proposed the Deepfool method to find the closet 
projection of input x on the decision surface. By moving x 
along the direction of the found projection, it produces 
perturbation with significantly small magnitude. The 
advantage of such methods is the high attacking success rate 
resulting from the full access to the target classifier. The 
disadvantage is that it is hard to use them to perform black-
box attack. The other ones optimize the well-designed metrics 
to generate adversarial examples, e.g., Nicolas et al. [13] 
proposed to train a local model to substitute the target DNN. 
The knowledge of the model and training data for victim is no 
longer needed. They achieved 96.19% success rate against a 
well-trained classifier. 
More threateningly, empirical evidence shows that 
adversarial examples often transfer between models trained for 
the same task [6]. Goodfellow [14] illustrated this 
phenomenon by introducing the transferability of the 
adversarial examples. Further researches manifest that 
adversarial examples occur in large, contiguous regions, or the 
adversarial subspaces. Florian et al. [15] proposed methods to 
directly estimate the dimensionality of these subspaces and 
raise concern about the safety of modern machine learning 
methods. 
B. Generative adversarial network 
Conventionally, generating problems can be modeled as 
finding a mapping between an input following a given 
distribution and an output following the target distribution. 
The key problem is that modeling the target distribution could 
be extremely hard and time consuming. Recently, Goodfellow 
et al. [16] introduced the generative adversarial network 
framework to address this problem. Inspired by the game 
theory, they trained two models, the generator D – the 
function to distinguish artificial data from natural data and the 
discriminator G – the function to generate data out of input 
following a source distribution aiming at fooling the 
discriminator. The generator can efficiently generate images. 
Despite the sound output, the training progress is unstable. By 
adopting new distance and modification in training strategy, 
Martin et al. [17] proposed the WGAN algorithm to improve 
stability of learning strategy and solved the problems like 
mode collapse. 
However, as an unconditioned generative model, the 
traditional GAN framework does not have the control over the 
generated data. In other words, we cannot predict the labels of 
the generated images. Mehdi et al. [18] introduced the 
conditional generative adversarial net (CGAN) to enroll the 
label information in the training progress and train a generator 
producing data of the given class. The infoGAN [19] and 
ACGAN [20] can also control the output with additional input 
but are more complex in their framework. The detail of our 
methods will be introduced in the next section. 
III. APPROACH OVERVIEW 
In this section, we will introduce two proposed methods, 
which can enroll the label information and train generative 
model at the same time. 
A. CGAN-F 
CGAN controls the network output by enrolling extra 
information y in both training schedule of discriminator and 
generator. Extra information y can be any kinds of intended 
information, e.g., class labels or data distribution, and 
commonly, we feed it into both the generative model and 
discriminative model as additional input layer. 
The overall architecture of our proposed conditional 
generative adversarial nets for fake images is shown in Fig. 1. 
We define k as the index of source class and k’ as the index of 
the target class. On the side of generative model, the prior 
input noise z and y are combined to form the conditional input 
and outputs images x’ are generated. From the aspect of the 
discriminative model, the natural data x, or artificial data x’, 
and y are feed into the discriminative model to distinguish the 
fake examples from the natural data. 
We define the adversarial loss function as:  
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Fig. 1. The overall architecture of our proposed methods. Visualization of the information flow of CGAN-F is in (a), and CGAN-adv in (b). 
We add a loss by considering the influence of target to fool 
the classifier f, which can be formulated as: 
  fool fL E loss x',k '     (3) 
where lossf denotes the loss function for training the classifier 
f. The loss Lfool encourages the generator to generate images 
that are more likely to be misclassified. 
Our objective function is described as follows:  
 CGAN foolL L L   (4) 
Where α is a hyper-parameter. Increasing α encourages the 
generator to output images more likely to be misclassified but 
may also make the generator produce low quality output. 
The traditional training strategy will raise the problem of 
generating low quality images. To avoid this issue, we make 
three improvements on the traditional training strategy: 
 Pre-train the model with the traditional CGAN 
training strategy and tune it finely, which can help the 
model to output sound images of the given class. 
 Transform the extra information y from label k to the 
target label k’. It helps the generator to cheat the game 
as the lossf helps the discriminative model to 
distinguish between raw and generated ones but 
generative model gets no help. 
 After every n iteration, the training process rolls back 
to the traditional training for one iteration. With this, 
the generated images are more likely to remain correct  
classification by a human observer 
The complete training algorithm of our model is described 
in table Ⅰ. 
TABLE I.  CGAN-F TRAINING ALGRORITHM 
Algorithm 1  
Input parameters: loss weight α, batch size m, the number of iterations 
between the traditional training iterations n, the total training 
epoches N, the numbers of iteration in each epoch k, the loss 
function L, the given class t, the target class t’. 
1: Load the pretrained model. 
2: for i = 0 → N do 
3:     for j = 0 → k do 
4:         Sample images {x(i)}i=1~m from the real data. 
5:         Sample noise {z(i)}i=1~m from normal distribution. 
6:             x'  ← G(z , t) 
7:             if j mod n = 0 then 
8:                 d_fake ← D(x’ , t) 
9:             else 
10:                 d_fake ← D(x’ , t’) 
11:             end if 
12:             d_real ← D(x , t) 
13:             d_loss ← L(1 , d_real)+L(0 , d_fake) 
14:             Optimize D 
15:             Sample noise {z’(i)}i=1~m from normal distribution. 
16:              x' ← G(z,t) 
17:              g_loss ← L(1 , D(x’))+ α*L(t’ , x’) 
18:              Optimize G 
19:     end for 
20: end for 
B. CGAN-Adv 
Generating fake images directly can cause the problem of 
unstable training. Inspired by adversarial example, we train 
the network to generate images and the corresponding 
perturbations at the same time. Fig. 1 shows the overall 
architecture of our conditional generative adversarial network 
for adversarial examples. 
Since we use the CGAN framework, (1) is adopted. Also, 
we feed the output of the encoder within the generative model 
into a new decoder to get the corresponding perturbation r, 
while the old decoder still outputs the artificial image x’. To 
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Fig. 2. The architecture of the target classifier is described in (a). The discriminator and generator for CGAN-f are shown in (b) and (c) respectively. The 
discriminator and generator for CGAN-Adv are shown in (b) and (c) repectively. 
apply this model to targeted attack, we also introduce loss 
function as (3). 
The average magnitude of the perturbation is important to 
make the output similar to the source image. However, if the 
magnitude becomes too low, the training could become quite 
unstable. To achieve low magnitude and stabilize the training, 
we use the following loss: 
   mL E mean abs r c     (5) 
where c is the low bound of the average magnitude that we 
can accept. 
Although we tried to add the corresponding perturbations 
into the source images to get the result, such operation can 
cause a problem that the pixel value may exceed 255, the 
upper bound of pixel value. Previous work ignores this 
problem, and we address it by using normalization technique 
after element-add operation. The normalization is as follows: 
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x' p*rx
p
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
 (6) 
where p is a hyper-parameter controlling the weight of the 
perturbation. 
Equation (5) puts a simple constraint on the perturbation, 
but the perturbation still can wipe out the important part of the 
generated image. To address this problem, we add a loss 
function to guarantee that the result is similar to the source 
class as follows: 
     1zrecg fz ~ P zL E log D x | y     (7) 
Finally, our objective function can be written as: 
 CGAN fool m recgL L * L * L * L       (8) 
where α, β and γ are the hyper parameters. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
In this section, we evaluate our methods on the dataset of 
MNIST [21] and Fashion-MNIST [22]. All experiments are 
white-box attack. In other words, we have total access to the 
classifier model. 
A. Experimental setup 
We use the same model setting for the two classifiers 
MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. The structure is shown in Fig. 2. 
For convince, we implement the CGAN as described in the 
Reference [18], so for the generative model, the input vector’s 
dimension should be d+n, where d is the dimension of the 
input noise and n represents the number of classes. In our case, 
we use d=62 and n=10. We train them for over 50 epochs and 
the final performance is 99.1 % and 92.0% on MNIST and  
Fashion-MNIST respectively. 
The corresponding class labels of Fashion-MNIST are t-
shirt/top, trouser, pullover, dress, coat, sandal, shirt, sneaker, 
bag and ankle boot, which map to 0 to 9 respectively. 
Both of dataset MNIST and Fashion-MNIST have 10 
classes. So, to test the performance on these two datasets, we 
randomly select two groups of source-target maps as shown in 
Table Ⅱ for CGAN-F and CGAN-Adv respectively. In test 
stage, the input Gaussian noise is same for both CGAN-F 
         
(a)                                                                                   (b)                                                                                  (c) 
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Fig. 3. The results of proposed methods. The source label of  the sub-figures in column 0 to 9 is 0 to 9 repectively, and the title of each sub-figure means the 
classifying result. The results of CGAN-F on Fashion-MNIST for target map1 and 2 are shown in (a) and (d) respectively. The results of CGAN-Adv on Fashion-
MNIST are in (b) and (e), and the results on MNIST are in (c) and (f). 
and CGAN-Adv. 
TABLE II.  SOURCE-TO-TARGET MAP OF CLASSES 
Map index Map 
1 {0:7, 1:3, 2:9, 3:1, 4:2, 5:8, 6:5, 7:0, 8:4, 9:6} 
2 {0:6, 1:7, 2:1, 3:5, 4:0, 5:8, 6:4, 7:9, 8:2, 9:3} 
The parameters for generative model and the 
discriminative model of  CGAN-F is set as follows: learning 
rate 0.0002, the batch size 128, the number of epochs 25. 
Some generated images are presented in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Output of the pretrained CGAN. 
B. CGAN-F 
For generative model, we employ an encoder with two 
linear layers and a decoder containing two deconvolution 
layers. For discriminative model, we adopt two convolution 
layers and two linear layers. The detail of the model is 
described in Fig. 2. 
From Fig. 3, we can find that CGAN-F can perform well 
when dealing with source-target pairs that are similar in 
outline, e.g., pullover and coat. However, when it comes to 
pairs distinguished in outline, the performance was 
unsatisfied, e.g., trouser and sneaker. The results indicate 
that it is possible to generate attack examples directly with 
GAN. 
C. CGAN-Adv 
To verify with CGAN-Adv, we build the generative 
model with an encoder containing two linear layers and two 
decoders that have two deconvolution layers respectively. 
The setting of discriminative model is barely the same as 
that of CGAN. The detail of the generator is described in 
Fig. 2. 
We train our models with Adam-optimizer [23]. The 
batch size is 64. The initial learning rate is 0.0002 and 
decrease 0.1 every 10 epochs. The hyper parameters are set 
as: α=0.5, β=50, γ=0.4, p=0.25 and c=0.23. The generated 
images on Fashion-MNIST are shown in Fig. 3.  
Besides, the results on MNIST are shown in Fig. 3(??). 
For most results, human can easily recognize their labels. 
However, the classifier misclassified all the examples 
shown in the figure. We adjust our hyper parameters β and c 
to reduce the magnitude of perturbation, but it may affect 
the success attack rate. 
The purpose of introducing loss Lm is to low the 
average magnitude of perturbation, and we find the average 
magnitude is only around 13.2% of the raw data and 5% of 
the maximum magnitude by statistic. The low average 
magnitude suggests a good similarity between the final 
images and source images. Also, through parallel training 
with Lrecg, we find the results of CGAN-Adv appear better 
than that of CGAN-F. It can be seen that some details of the 
images are preserved, e.g., pattern on the shirts and holes 
 
Fig. 5. The generated source images are shown in (a). The corresponding 
perturbations are shown in (b). The final results are shown in (c). 
 
(a)                  (b)                   (c) 
 
on the sandals. Some of the output images are shown in Fig. 
5. From the images of perturbation, we can observe that the 
generative model tries to find the key points in recognizing 
the target label, and by increasing the values of the key 
pixels, it can fool the classifier. 
We further evaluate the efficiency of CGAN-Adv based 
on the average time for producing a single attack instance. 
We compare CGAN-Adv with some common methods, 
such as the iterative least-likely class method (ILCM) [24], 
the FGSM, the Deepfool and the WRM [25]. We use the 
five methods to generate 10k attack instances and all the 
methods achieve high attack success rate. The average run-
time is shown in Table Ⅲ，and it can be observed that 
CGAN-Adv can output instances much faster than the other 
two methods. Besides, the traditional adversarial example 
generating methods require the source image to produce an 
attack instance, therefore, additional storage space is needed. 
However, CGAN-Adv does not need additional storage 
space, which makes CGAN-Adv advantageous when 
applying to large-scale attack. 
TABLE III.  AVEARGE TIME FOR PRODUCING AN INSTANCE 
Dataset MNIST Fashion-MNIST 
ILCM 62ms 65ms 
FGSM 53ms 61ms 
Deepfool 59ms 61ms 
WRM 73ms 80ms 
CGAN-Adv(ours) 13ms 13ms 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this work, we propose two methods to generate 
images to attack a trained DNN classifier, namely CGAN-F 
and CGAN-Adv. The CGAN-F can output the attack images 
in one stage, while the CGAN-Adv in two stages. Our 
experiments have shown the possibility to generate images 
directly by using GAN, and such images can be 
misclassified by the classifier while being correctly 
classified by human. Compared with previous work, our 
work can produce attack images more efficiently. 
In the future, we will concentrate on find better attack 
image and reduce the magnitude of the perturbation. 
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